Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) two-person coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects doubt in others' preferences to maximize their own payo and (ii) this doubts are, in somes instances, justied. We report on new experiments investigating whether the inequality in payos between players, maintained in most lab implementations of this game, drives such behavior. Our data point to a negative answer, which is robust to: improved saliency of decisions, repetitionbased learning and cultural dierences between France and Poland. Our results thus restrain the set of possible driving forces, although the challenge remains largely open.
Introduction
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This literature relies on a sequential two-player one-shot game originally introduced by Rosenthal (1981) in which the rst mover either decides alone on the nal issue of the game or relies on the second mover. In that case, the second mover only has to decide whether to maximize both players' payo or not. But since the rst mover loses a lot should the second mover fail to maximize payos, a very likely outcome is the Pareto dominated one in which the rst mover decides alone. This puzzling empirical outcome, originally introduced as a theoretical conjecture by Rosenthal, is robustly highlighted in all lab implementations of this game. Such a coordination failure arises due to two dierent driving forces: rst, as expected by Rosenthal, subjects who play as rst movers are very frequently reluctant to rely on second movers; second, surprisingly enough, an important share of second movers indeed happens to be unreliable and fail to maximize both players' payo. The aim of this short paper is to investigate one possible explanation for these puzzling behaviors, namely aversion to inequality. We ask two questions: do unequal payos generated by the dominant outcome (i) make second movers unwilling to maximize both players' payo? and (ii) make rst movers reluctant to rely on actually reliable second movers? We implement six variations of the payo structure of the game, which all share the main strategic dimensions of the original formulation. The Baselines are compared to Egalitarian Treatments, which restore the equality between players in the payos generated by the Pareto-dominant outcome. We also provide evidence of the cross cultural robustness of our results, through complementary sessions ran in Warsaw (Poland). Our data unambiguously reject the aversion to inequality hypothesis, as we nd no causal eect of Egalitarian Treatments on either players' behavior. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the remaining open avenues, both tentative and based on our data.
2 Two puzzling behaviors in existing laboratory experiments Table 1 provides an overview of previous experimental implementations of the game we study. There are only three dierent outcomes in the game, detailed in the left-hand side of the Table: either the rst mover (henceforth player A) chooses to decide alone by picking L, or he relies on the second mover's (henceforth player B's ) decision by choosing R. In this case, both players' payos are higher if r is chosen rather than l. The right-hand side of the Table summarizes the share of each outcome among all observed decisions, as well as the frequency of action r conditional on reliance from player A.
The main focus of the original study of Beard and Beil (1994) is to test Rosenthal's conjecture that subjects may be unwilling to rely on other's ability to maximize payos hence challenging subgame perfectness. 1 Their experimental evidence supports the Rosenthal conjecture: while the share of payo maximizing subjects is high in the sub-population of player Bs who are relied upon (from 83% in their treatment 1 to 100% in treatments 3 and 4, for instance), most player 1 st is so euse in this prtiulr gme suh ehvior mounts to use wekly dominted strtegiesF ee tquemet nd ylersztejn @PHIHA for more detiled nlysis of the theoretil properties of the gmeF Beard & Beil (1994) and Cooper and Van Huyck (2003) , in cents of USD in Goeree & Holt (2001) , in Yens in Beard et al. (2001) and in Euros in our treatments.
As decide not to rely on their partners. The comparison across treatments shows that behavior highly depends on the size of stakes: the larger the cost of being unreliant, the higher the reliance rate from player As; the higher the cost of being unreliable, the higher the reliability rate from player Bs. Beard, Beil, and Mataga (2001) replicate some of these treatments using Japanese subjects. While the results from their treatment 1 are in line with previous US evidence, behavior in treatment 2 is in a sense more striking. Because of the increase in the monetary incentives to reach (R, r) as compared to the secure outcome (L), a much higher share of player As rely on their partner from 21% in treatment 1 to 50% in treatment 2. However, although the payos for player B remain unchanged between the two treatments, the share of payo maximizing decisions (conditional on having been relied upon in the rst place) falls from 83% to 64%. Importantly, both of these studies elicit decisions from player Bs conditional on the prior reliance from player As. Hence, this evidence does not suce to infere the actual behavior in the entire population of player Bs, since the decisions of player Bs paired with unreliant player As cannot be observed. In contrast, Goeree and Holt (2001) and Cooper and Van Huyck (2003) use a simultaneousmove game of either a normal or an extensive form, and conrm the robustness of previous evidence. First, even when player Bs are actually reliable (such as in the Goeree and Holt (2001) treatment 1), a large share of player As appear reluctant to rely on them. Second, in a large variety of treatments (treatments 2 and 3 in Goeree and Holt (2001) as well as both treatments of Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003) player Bs actually appear to a large extent unreliable decision r occurs from 15% to 25% of the time. Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2010) study the role of the extent of information about the interaction partner. To that end, they implement the normal form of the game and thus elicit decisions in the whole population of player As and Bs. In the initial round of their baseline treatment (last two rows of Table 1 ), 23% of player As prefer the secure choice and 100% of player Bs that are relied upon actually turn out reliable. This proportion is however much lower (80%) in the whole population of player Bs they could be matched with.
Evidence from subsequent 9 rounds of the same game (where repetition takes place under a perfect stranger design with xed roles and round-robin matching) suggests that learning happens to be of very little help to discipline that behavior the overall frequency of reliable decisions from player Bs amounts to 81%. More generally, this behavior of player Bs appears insensitive to any of the experimental treatments, which means that neither repetition-based learning, nor forwardlooking information through messages, nor even backward-looking information from observation of past decisions suce to discipline player Bs' choices of weakly dominated actions in this payo conguration.
Empirical strategy
From existing experimental evidence, two puzzling behaviors arise: a large share of player As appear reluctant to rely on actually reliable player Bs; but at the same time the weakly dominated strategy is often chosen by player Bs. The purpose of this paper is to test whether such behavior is related to the payo structure of the game. 2 To illustrate the point, the general structure of the game is presented in Table 2 of which all the lab implementations presented in Table 1 above are particular cases. The crucial properties of the game hold if the parameters a, . . . , f take non-negative values and all payos are positive. Player B (weakly) maximizes both players payo 2 his hypothesis hs een lredy rised in the literture ! see for instne @qoeree nd roltD PHHID pFIRITA ! ut to the est of our knowledge it hs never een empirilly looked tF yne exeption is tretment T in ferd nd feil @IWWRAD disussed in etion QFIF urprisinglyD this tretment is not ommented on in the originl pperD neither it is disussed s men to ssess the sensitivity of ehviors to more equlized pyo'sF sn ny seD s stressed oveD the originl design of ferd nd feil @IWWRA is inpproprite to study plyer fs9 ehvior sine their deisions re eliited only onditionl on plyer e9s hoieF by selecting r, while player A prefers L to the outcome (R, l) that is attained when relying on an unreliable player B. As a result, the game has two Nash equilibria, (L, l) and (R, r). The rst one is imperfect (since it entails player B's weakly dominant strategy l), while the second is perfect and Pareto-ecient. But in most experimental implementations of this game, the payos from the perfect Nash equilibrium are much higher for player A than for player B, i.e. a ≥ b, a
Although this does not make B's unreliant decision l a rational answer to A's reliance, non-standard preferences involving aversion to inequality might be the reason why player Bs forgo eciency at a personal monetary cost (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . Moreover, if player As believe that this sort of preferences exists among player Bs, they may prefer to choose the secure option instead of relying on their partner. In order to test this hypothesis, our empirical approach consists in complementing the original payo structure with variations that maintain the strategic properties of the game, while equalizing the payos both players earn in case of payo-maximizing coordination, i.e. such that
Overview of the experimental design Table 3 provides a full overview of the payo variations we implement. Our starting point is Baseline Treatment 1 which corresponds to the Beard and Beil (1994) treatment 1 and the Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2010) replication to which we associate an egalitarian version, Egalitarian Treatment 1 this is also treatment 6 in Beard and Beil (1994) . As shown in the last two columns of the Table, providing the observed proportions of reliant decisions (R) from player As and reliable decisions (r) from player Bs, we obtain virtually no eect of equalizing payos in the Pareto-ecient outcome on players' behavior. An important shortcoming of this pair of treatments is that saliency may be violated as reliance and reliability only induce a 0.25 Euros 3 he tretment e'ets we seek to identify re est illustrted in the frmework of the pehr nd hmidt @IWWWA model of inequlityEversionF foth sujets i, j ∈ {A, B} re ssumed to hoose their tions in the gme presented in le P ording to the extended utility funtion de(ned on outome O generting pyo'
rmeters 0 ≤ βi ≤ αi mesure the sensitivity of plyer i to inequlity @1O i <O j = 1 − 1O i >O j = 1 if j erns more thn iD H otherwiseAF he pyo' strutures of our fseline retments @fI nd fP in le QA re suh tht ∃(αB, βB) :
BT |αB, βB)D so tht plyer f whose utility is de(ned y @IA my prefer outome (R, l) over (R, r)F fy the sme tokenD iglitrin retments @iIER in le QA re uilt in suh wy tht ∀(αB, βB) : UB((R, l) ET |αB, βB) < UB((R, r) ET |αB, βB)D so tht for the sme preferene prmetersD plyer f now prefers (R, r) over (R, l)F es for plyer esD de(ne θT s the pereived likelihood tht plyer fs9 reliztion of (αB, βB) mkes him prefer (R, l) over (R, r) in retment T F sf plyer e is riskEneutrl expeted utility mximizerD then EUA(R T |αA, βA, θT ) = θT UA((R, l)
resultD if the fer tht plyer fs re inequlity verse is high enoughD plyer e my prefer the seure hoie in the fseline retmentD sine ∃(αA, βA, θBT ) : UA(L BT αA, βA) ≥ EUA(R BT |αA, βA, θBT )F fy ontrstD the iglitrin retment is designed in suh wy tht θET = 0F For each treatment, the rst three columns provide the payos of each player, in Euros. The next two columns give the number of 20 subjects-sessions ran in each location. The last two columns summarize the average behavior observed in each treatment over all subjects and repetitions.
variation in subjects' payos. In Egalitarian Treatment 3, built on ET1, we improve the saliency of reliable decisions for player B: the opportunity cost of playing r (instead of the weakly dominated decision l) against R is now 1.5 Euros. 4 Similarly, in Egalitarian Treatment 4 based on ET3, we improve the saliency of being reliant for player A the payo dierence between the two Nash equilibria amounts to 1.5 Euros instead of 0.25 Euros. In both of these treatments, we maintain equality in payos between players in the Pareto ecient outcome. We derive mixed results from these two additional treatments: the behavior of player Bs is unaected by both changes, while the share of reliant player As signicantly increases (from around 50% to 73%) between ET3 and ET4.
In all treatments described up till now, a strong payo inequality between players remains if player A chooses L. As a result, it could be that A's choice of being reliant is itself driven by the willingness to move away from outcomes with too much inequality in payos. In Egalitarian Treatment 2, built on ET4, we restore equality in the imperfect equilibrium by raising player B's payo. 5 Surprisingly enough, the main outcome from this treatment is that it strongly disciplines the behavior of player Bs the weakly dominated action is now almost never chosen. The behavior of player As, by contrast, is unaected by this change. To assess whether such a high rate of secure choices despite a widespread reliability in the population of player Bs is reinforced by payo inequality, we close our design with Baseline Treatment 2, built on ET2, in which the Paretodominant outcome gives rise to payo inequality in favor of player A. 6 Again, we fail to nd any 4 sn the ourse of trils leding to the urrent experimentl tretmentsD we lso slightly rised ll pyo's equl to SFH in iI to SFS in iQD in n ttempt to hek whether deimls hve ny e'et on plyers9 ehviorF 5 fy the sme token s oveD we slightly rise the pyo' erned y plyer e in se of unsuessful ttempts to rely on fD from SFS to TFSF 6 sn designing this tretmentD we seek to introdue pyo' inequlity etween plyersD while holding onstnt the slieny of eing relile for plyer fF e thus hoose to redue plyer f9s pyo' in (R, l) to UFHHD insted of VFSH eect of this dimension of the game, as both players behave in the same manner as in ET2. All our main treatments of interest have been ran in Paris (France). The last concern we want to address is the possibility that our treatment eects are driven by culture-specic motives. We provide robustness evidence on this dimension through additional sessions ran in Warsaw (Poland). We chose the three treatments in which observed behavior is in our view the most striking, i.e. ET2, ET3 and ET4. The number of sessions in each location is provided in Table 3. 3.2
Experimental procedures
Each payo variation described above denes a treatment, and all treatments are implemented separately using a between-subject design. The design is kept the same for all treatments, based on the procedures of Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2010) . We introduce two important changes to Beard and Beil's genuine design. First, we study the eect of learning by repeating the one-shot game 10 times. 7 Each occurrence is one-shot in the sense that: roles are xed; pairs are rematched in each round using a perfect stranger, round-robin procedure; we avoid the end-game eect by providing no information about the exact number of repetitions; take-home earnings are derived from one round, randomly drawn out of the ten at the end of each experimental session. Second, we elicit both players' decisions in each occurrence of the game. To that matter, we break the original sequentiality of the game and ask each player for unconditional choices in each round. Players are only informed about their own payos at the end of each round.
A typical session proceeds as follows. Upon arrival, subjects sign an individual consent form. Participants then enter the lab, where they are randomly assigned to their computers and asked to ll in a small personal questionnaire containing basic questions about their age, gender, education, etc. The written instructions are then read aloud. players are informed that they will play some (unrevealed) number of rounds of the same game, each round with a dierent partner, and that their own role will not change during the experiment. Before starting, subjects are asked to ll in a quiz assessing their understanding of the game they are about to play. Once the quiz and all remaining questions are answered, the experiment begins. Prior to the rst round, players are randomly assigned to their roles either A or B. They are then anonymously and randomly matched to a partner and asked for their choice: R or L for player As, r or l for player Bs. At the end of each round, each player is informed only about her own payo. Once all pairs complete a round of the game, subjects are informed whether a new round starts. In this case, pairs are rematched according to a perfect stranger matching procedure (any pair meets only once in the in iPD nd ordingly djust the pyo' stemming from deision LF 7 elthough osenthl mde his onjeture for oneEshot gmeD ferd nd feil note in their genuine pper @ppF PTIEPTPA tht it seems eqully vlid for repeted plyF euthors furthermore stte tht lerning through experiene my 'et people9s ehvior independently of pyo'Erelted ftorsF session). At the end of the experiment, one round is randomly drawn and each player receives the amount corresponding to her gains in that round plus a show-up fee.
All treatments taken together, we ran a total of 21 experimental sessions: 16 took place between June 2009 and January 2012 in the Laboratoire d'Economie Experimentale de Paris (LEEP) at University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and 5 were carried out in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at Warsaw University in February 2012. 8 In both laboratories, the recruitment of subjects makes use of an on-line registration interface adapted using Orsee (Greiner, 2004 ) and the experiment is computerized through a software developed under Regate (Zeiliger, 2000) .
Each session lasted about 45 minutes, with an average payo of 14 Euros in Paris and 28 PLN (about 7 Euros) in Warsaw. 9 No subject participated in more than one experimental session.
Amongst 420 participants, 206 are males and 214 are females. A vast majority of population (332 subjects) are students of various elds of specialization, 193 of them likely to have some background in game theory due to their eld of study. 10 297 subjects have taken part in economic experiments before. Participants' average age is about 24.
Results
In what follows, statistical inference is based on between-treatment tests for the signicance of dierences in the proportions of each outcome of interest. We use two kinds of statistical tests. In round 1, where all observations are independent, we use two-sided Fisher's exact tests. In rounds 2-10, individual observations may be correlated within each session due to the rematching of subjects from one round to the other. We account for this data structure by using the following parametric procedure. First, we run an OLS regression of treatment dummies on a dummy dependant variable representing the outcome of interest. In this setup, coecients correspond to the proportions of outcomes of interest in a given treatment, so that t-tests and F -tests on coecients allow for testing linear hypotheses about the equality of proportions between treatments. In order to account for the within-session correlation, we cluster data at the session level, and use leave-one-out jackknifed standard errors to deal with the issue of potential small-sample bias. This method is applied to data coming from rounds 1-10 and 2-10. 11 8 ht from the sixth session run in rswD implementing iRD hs een lost s result of softwre rshF 9 por prenh sujetsD ll the pyo's in experimentl instrutions were expressed in iurosF por olish sujetsD in the instrutions we use the sme pyo' shemeD ut expressed in ixperimentl gurrent nits @igAF por the ske of pymentD ig were onverted to olish loty @vxA ording to the rte I igaP vxF he prtiiption fee equls S iuros in ris nd to IH vx @round PFS iuros ording to the usul exhnge rte in PHIPA in rswF ine vst mjority of our sujets re studentsD nd petty student jos usully py out V iuros in ris nd round IS vx in rswD we strongly elieve tht prtiipnts9 monetry inentives re omprle etween ountriesF 10 hisiplines suh s eonomisD engineeringD mngementD politil sieneD psyhologyD mthemtis pplied in soil sieneD mthemtisD omputer sieneD soiologyF 11 he proedure is desried in more detil in tquemet nd ylersztejn @PHIHAF Note. For each treatment in row, the rst column provides the total number of observations the number of subjects equals N in Beard and Beil's experiment, and N/10 in ours. The three subsequent columns provide unconditional decisions observed in each treatment, as well as the rate of reliability conditional on reliance from player A (relevant especially for Beard and Beil's data). In the last four columns, we present the empirical frequencies of the four possible outcomes (two of which (L, l) and (L, r) are not observable in Beard and Beil's data).
To ease the description of observed behavior, we use the following nomenclature. A cooperative decision means R (r) for player As (Bs). A cooperative outcome accordingly corresponds to the Pareto-Nash equilibrium (R, r), while a coordinated outcome describes a situation where either of the existing Nash equilibria (L, l) or (R, r) is attained. Last, we label coordination failures following a statistical terminology, where Type 1 error corresponds to outcome (L, r), while (R, l) is a Type 2 error.
Replication of Beard and Beil's treatments
Our rst comparison of interest is BT1 against ET1, two treatments previously studied by Beard and Beil (1994) . In Table 4 , we summarize the main outcomes from both their and our implementation of these two treatments. The data collected by Beard and Beil (1994) in the context of a one-shot sequential-move game seem to favor the aversion to inequality hypothesis. The rate of reliance by player As doubles, from 34.3% (12 cases over 35) in the Baseline Treatment 1 to 69.3% (18/26) in the Egalitarian Treatment 1 (p=0.010), and the rate of conditional reliability from player Bs increases from 83.3% (10/12) to 100% (18/18) (p=0.152). Therefore, player As indeed act more cooperatively in an environment where a bilateral cooperation gives equal prots to both partners, and player Bs actually seem to prefer an equal split of gains for cooperation, even though the magnitude of this preference is marginal. Our replication of both treatments in a repeated simultaneous-move game yields results that are more mixed and most importantly non-persistent. For inexperienced player As (actions observed in round 1), the likelihood of action R also doubles like in Beard and Beil's study, Note. For each treatment in row, the second column gives the number of observations the number of individual subjects equals N/10. For the rst round of play, Rounds 2-10 and overall averages, the three sub-columns provide the average frequency of: reliance from player A (decision R), reliability from player B (decision r) and reliability conditional on being relied on (r|R).
increasing from 23.3% in BT 1 to 46.7% in ET 1 (p=0.103), but player Bs are at the same time marginally less reliable the frequency of cooperative choices falls from 80% to 63.3% (p=0.252). Importantly, these dierences completly fade away among experienced players (actions observed in rounds 2-10), where subjects' behavior is virtually identical under both conditions: the frequency of decisions R varies between 51.9% in BT1 and 45.6% in ET1 (p=0.574), while the frequencies of decisions r by player Bs are 80.7% and 73.7% (p=0.602). 12 4.2 Aversion to inequality under improved saliency Table 5 summarizes the outcomes from our four companion treatments, along with a recall of the main results from BT1 and ET1. For the three egalitarian treatments (ET2, ET3 and ET4), we split the results according to the location of the experiment. This allows to assess the extent of cultural specicities in the behavior observed in this game. In light of the data from these three treatments, it is hard to claim that the patterns of behavior observed in both countries are systematically dierent. Player As' behavior is subject to only minor discrepancies and seems quite alike in France and Poland. For treatments ET 2 and 12 sn line with individul ehviorD outomes do not ret muh to tretmentF yverllD only SQ7 of outomes in fID nd RUFU7 in iI @paHFPRWAD re oordintedF goopertive outomes ount for RIFQ7 nd QQ7 @paHFRWUAD respetivelyF ype I errors re extremely widespredD ttining QWFQ7 nd QWFU7 @paHFWSSA of glol outomesF he most ostly ype P errors re lso pronounedD rehing UFU7 nd IPFU7 @paHFPPHA in f I nd i PD respetivelyF ET 4, players Bs' behavior in both countries is practically identical. The sole visible dierence concerns player Bs' behavior in treatment ET 3, where Polish subjects overall happen slightly more likely to select action r than French subjects. Statistical tests are however unable to reject the null of equal means in the two countries. 13 We therefore do not consider the cultural background as an inuential factor in our experimental data, and accordingly pool both locations in the data analysis below.
In ET3 and ET4, we improve the saliency of the action leading to the Pareto-ecient outcome for each player in turn. As compared to ET1, ET3 increases player Bs' conditional surplus from playing r, while ET4 furthermore increases player As' conditional surplus from playing R. Confronting these three experimental conditions, we observe very little variation in player Bs' actions: although reliable decisions are observed slightly more often when incentives become more salient for instance, in 63% of round 1 decisions in ET1 against 80% and 77% in ET4 we fail to identify any statistically signicant dierence. 14 Setting ET1 as a benchmark, conditions ET3 and ET4 also allow to investigate two important issues concerning player As' decision-making. First, do player As react to partners' enhanced incentives to act reliably in ET3 notwithstanding player Bs' actual neutrality? Second, do player As react to the enhancement in their own incentives to rely on their partners in ET4? Based on our data, the answer to the rst question is clearly negative: the improvement of the saliency of player Bs' decisions between ET1 and ET3 only results in a marginal and statistically insignicant drop in the frequency of player As' secure choices. 15 The answer to the second question, in turn, seems positive. Although ET4 brings no signicant improvement in term of player As' reliance in the initial round, the increase in the rate of reliability becomes highly signicant in subsequent rounds. 16 ET2 is designed so as to detect another potential motivation underlying reliance: as compared to ET4, payos generated by a secure choice are equalized, so that one should observe a fall in reliance if player As use decision R to move away from outcomes with highly unequal payos. We 13 he uolmogorovEmirnov test using ll session verges does not detet di'erenes etween the two ountries neither in the popultion of plyer es @p = 0.980AD nor in the popultion of plyer fs @paHFQIUAF e n test the nullity of the di'erene for eh tretment seprtely only in the (rst roundD when individul deisions re not orreltedF he pEvlues re p=HFSTW in iPD nd paI in iQ nd iR for plyer es Y nd paHFTWUD paHFTWSD paHFQUP for plyer fsF he results from prmetri regressions @see etion SA on(rm this onlusionF 14 he pEvlues from men di'erenes etween tretments iI nd iQGiR re paHFIUSGpaHFQWW in round ID paHFRWIGp =HFRTI in rounds PEIHD paHFRRTGpaHFRIV in rounds IEIHF he null hypothesis tht ehvior is the sme in ll three tretments nnot e rejeted either in round I @paHFPWHAD or in rounds PEIH @paHFUSQAD or rounds IEIH @paHFUIHAF 15 paHFRTW in round ID paHFPRW in rounds PEIHD p =HFIWQ in rounds IEIHF 16 sn round IX paHFRTW ginst iID paHFVHW ginst iQY in rounds PEIHX paHFHIQ ginst iID paHFHHR ginst iQY for rounds IEIHX paHFHHV ginst iID paHFHHU ginst iRF iven though we nnot rejet the null hypothesis tht sujets9 ehvior in round I is the sme in ll three tretments @paHFRTPAD we do so for rounds PEIH @paHFHHTA nd rounds IEIH @paHFHHUAF 
Note. For each treatment (in row) the Table reports the distribution of player Bs (player As) according to the number of times decision l (L) is chosen over the 10 repetitions of the game: the cells refer to the number of individual subjects.
clearly reject this hypothesis in both the rst round (p=0.487) and in the subsequent repetitions (p=0.539). On the other hand, we nd a strong eect on player Bs' behavior after the rst round (where the rate of decisions r equals 84%). In this version of Egalitarian Treatment, subjects in the role of player B attain the highest proportion of decisions r, with almost 95% of actions r in rounds 2-10. 17 We close our design by considering a variation of ET2, in which the payos associated to the Pareto-dominant outcome are unequal between players. The comparison between BT2 and ET2 thus complements BT1-ET1 in a context in which payo dierences are salient, and in which the payos dierences are equalized between players in both Nash equilibria of the game. Once again, we nd no important inter-treatment dierences in both players' actions. 18 To get further insight into individual behavior, Table 6 groups player Bs and As in each treatment according to the number of times they choose (respectively) the weakly dominated decision l and the secure and unreliant action L over the 10 repetitions of the game. The general lesson we draw from this distribution is to rule out the possibility that aggregate decisions are only a matter of a few individual outliers. On the side of player Bs' behavior, the treatments can be split into two sub-groups. In BT2 and ET2, on the one hand, 75%-77% of subjects never use the weakly dominated strategy l, and the individual frequencies of actions l amongst the remaining subjects never exceed 50%. In BT1, ET1, ET3 and ET4, on the other hand, the proportion of perfectly reliable player Bs varies between 37% and 57%, and the number of actions l among remaining subjects is much more dispersed, often exceeding 5/10. As for player As, one can also notice two distinct groups of treatments. The rst sub-group, which gathers treatments BT2, ET2, and ET4, 17 gompring iP ginst iQX paHFUVP in round ID paHFHVI in rounds PEIHD paHFIHR in rounds IEIHY iP ginst iRX paHFSSS in round ID paHFHHT in rounds PEIHD paHFHHI in rounds IEIHF iven though we nnot rejet the null hypothesis tht sujets9 ehvior in round I is the sme in ll three tretments @paHFUHIAD we do so for rounds PEIH @paHFHIPA nd rounds IEIH @paHFHHQAF 18 por plyer esD we (nd paHFVIW in round I nd paHFURS in rounds PEIHD paHFURI in rounds IEIHF por plyer fsD paHFQHT in round I nd paHFVSV in rounds PEIHD paHFWHP in rounds IEIHF is characterized by an important share of subjects who always rely on their partners (ranging from 37% to 57% between treatments), and a relatively small proportion of those who never do so (between 7% and 13%). In BT1, ET1 and ET3, by contrast, most observations are dispersed away from the absolute reliance category, which is coupled with a high share of absolutely unreliant subjects.
Robustness analysis and discussion
To assess the robustness of the conclusions drawn from the above two-by-two mean comparisons, we now turn to a parametric analysis on individual data pooled over all treatments. The two outcomes of interest are the two decisions leading to the Pareto-dominant outcome: R from player A and r from player B. Due to the nature of these two variables, we run probit regression models. In order to better identify the channels inuencing behavior in each treatment, we include treatment variables measuring the specicity of the payo structure. The indicator Egalitarian Treatment is set to 1 when payos generated by the dominant outcome are equalized between players (i.e. in all ET treatments; 0 in BT ones). Two dummy variables are used to measure the improved saliency of each decision separately for player A set to 1 when the gap in player As' payo between (R, r) and (L) amounts to 1.50 EUR (treatments BT2, ET2, and ET4) and 0 if it equals only 0.25 EUR (BT1, ET1, and ET3) and for player B set to 1 in treatments BT2, ET2, ET3 and ET4. The variable player B Disadvantaged is set to 1 for treatments BT1, ET1, ET3, and ET4 (to 0 otherwise). Last, we capture potential cultural dierences by including an indicator of whether the session took place in Poland, or in France. Parametric models allows us to account for learning over time in a more disaggregated way. For each player, we distinguish two possible channels of time-dependencies. The rst one is one's own willingness to choose the decision leading to the Pareto-dominant outcome measured respectively by the decision to play R in the previous round for player A, 1[R t−1 ], and the similarly dened variable 1[r t−1 ] for player B. The second one is the observation of past decisions in the population of partners which can be inferred in some instances from the actual payo earned in the round, which subjects learn at the end of each period. To account for this dimension, we include the frequency of reliant/reliable decisions taken in a given session in all rounds up to the current one variables Population A t−1 and Population B t−1 Due to this conditioning on past behavior, we use data from rounds 2 to 10 only. Last, we also account for simple time eects through round specic dummies.
The results from separate estimations for each outcome variable are provided in Table 7 . The main additional insights from the regressions come from the learning variables. Subjects in both roles happen to be conservative in their decision-making: both past reliance and reliability increase the odds of similar behavior in the future. Beyond this eect, all time-dependent variables appear of little inuence on behavior. In particular, subjects do not seem to update their decision-making according to the actual behavior in the population of their partner. The estimates on treatment variables conrm that our conclusions are robust to this conditioning. For both players, we fail to observe any signicant eect of whether the decisions are elicited in France or in Poland. For player As, the only inuential dimension of the payo structure is the saliency of the opportunity cost of the secure choice (which is improved in treatments BT2 and ET2-ET4). For player Bs, saliency does not have any signicant eect. The only signicant change in behavior is obtained once the strategic disadvantage induced by low payos in the dominated outcome is eliminated, like in treatments BT2 and ET2. More importantly for our main purpose, equalizing payos in the Pareto-dominated outcome does not change neither player Bs' nor player As' behavior.
To sum up, the empirical answer to our main research questions is clearly negative: our data unambiguously reject the aversion to inequality hypothesis, previously discussed as a potential driving force behind the two puzzling behaviors we study. Through the replication of some of our treatments in an European Eastern country, we also conrm that cultural dierences coming e.g., by the focus on WEIRD people, as dened by Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) do not drive the observed behavior. This result stands in line with the robustness experiments performed by Beard, Beil, and Mataga (2001) on Japanese subjects. Again in accordance with previous evidence (as summarized in Section 2), we also nd that the saliency of reliance is an important driving force of the willingness to rely on partner. Last, all these results are robust to repetition-based learning through several periods of play of the one-shot game.
The only departure in our data from existing evidence comes from the determinants of player Bs' behavior. We not only fail to nd any eect of the saliency of the weakly dominated action, but also point to the strategic position in the game as an important driving force of reliability. In treatments ET2 and BT2, we restore equality in the payos generated by the Pareto-dominated outcome. A joint product is that it also aects the default earning of player Bs when player As decide alone on the nal outcome (by selecting the secure choice) which can be seen as a natural reference point for player Bs. Observed behavior in these last two treatments thus echoes the literature on money-burning behavior, showing that people sacrice their own wealth to decrease the wealth of others who benet from an exogenously implemented procedural advantage (see, e.g., Zizzo and Oswald, 2001) . 19 According to this interpretation, what we observe could thus be the result of player Bs' willingness to punish player As for procedural injustice. Whether the behavior of player Bs in this class of games can be explained by such preferences certainly deserves a more systematic investigation, which we leave open for future research.
Conclusion
Accumulated evidence on the experimental game introduced by Beard and Beil (1994) provide robust evidence on two puzzling behaviors. Experimental subjects both (i) often fail to maximize their own payo; (ii) are reluctant to rely on the proven reliability of others. One common property of most experimental implementations of this game is the strong payo inequality between players. This paper provides an experimental test of the hypothesis that both puzzles can be related to inequality aversion (as raised, e.g., by Goeree and Holt, 2001 ). Our design relies on 19 sn ordne with our results on the e'et of slienyD izzo nd yswld @PHHIA lso show tht the prie elstiity of the demnd for suh punishment is very lowF two dierent pairs of payo structures (one with equalized payos, one without), along with companion treatments strengthening the saliency of decisions and robustness sessions ran in a dierent country. In all instances, we fail to nd any signicant change in behavior in response to equalized payos in the dominant outcome. Our main contribution is thus to restrict the set of available hypothesis about these two puzzles. One remaining possibility is that subjects react to the strategic context rather than to the payo associated to the decision problem they face an hypothesis partly supported by some of our treatments, which warrants a more systematic investigation. A last hypothesis is a lack of commitment from subjects towards the experiment they are involved in (see, e.g., Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren, 2009, 2012) , because they fail to take the decision problem seriously enough. This question is next on our agenda.
